Measuring the Impact of Spectre and Meltdown by Prout, Andrew et al.
 1
Measuring the Impact of Spectre and Meltdown 
Andrew Prout, William Arcand, David Bestor, Bill Bergeron, Chansup Byun, Vijay Gadepally, Michael Houle, 
Matthew Hubbell, Michael Jones, Anna Klein, Peter Michaleas, Lauren Milechin, Julie Mullen, Antonio Rosa, 
Siddharth Samsi, Charles Yee, Albert Reuther, Jeremy Kepner 
MIT Lincoln Laboratory, Lexington, MA, U.S.A. 
 
Abstract—The Spectre and Meltdown flaws in modern 
microprocessors represent a new class of attacks that have been 
difficult to mitigate. The mitigations that have been proposed 
have known performance impacts. The reported magnitude of 
these impacts varies depending on the industry sector and 
expected workload characteristics. In this paper, we measure the 
performance impact on several workloads relevant to HPC 
systems. We show that the impact can be significant on both 
synthetic and realistic workloads. We also show that the 
performance penalties are difficult to avoid even in dedicated 
systems where security is a lesser concern. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Cybersecurity is a necessary component of all modern 
interconnected systems. High performance computing (HPC) 
systems present special challenges for cybersecurity as they are 
particularly sensitive to any performance impact of measures 
taken to enhance security. 
Three new security vulnerabilities that were made public in 
January 2018 attack the design of most modern 
microprocessors. The variants of these vulnerabilities are 
known as Spectre (variant 1 and 2) [Kocher] and Meltdown 
(variant 3) [Lipp]. These vulnerabilities represent an entirely 
new class of attacks and have proven particularly difficult to 
mitigate. The mitigations that have been developed are 
advertised to have negative performance impacts. In this paper, 
we attempt to measure those impacts. 
The organization of the rest of this paper is as follows.  
Section II describes the Spectre and Meltdown attacks in more 
detail.  Section III describes the experimental environment.  
Section IV describes the benchmarks chosen to highlight the 
performance impact of the mitigations.  Section V shows the 
performance results.  Section VI summarizes the results. 
II. SPECTRE AND MELTDOWN VULERABILITIES AND 
MIGITATIONS 
The Spectre and Meltdown vulnerabilities have been 
categorized into three variants. 
A. Variant 1: Spectre, Bounds Check Bypass 
Spectre variant 1 allows for an attacker to cause the 
speculative execution engine to load data on the basis of an 
array index that is past the actual end of the array. While this 
action will never be committed by the speculative execution 
engine into the main flow of execution, this action can cause 
arbitrary memory outside of the array to be loaded into various 
caches. The presence of this data in cache can then be detected 
by other code, leaking information. A well-crafted attack can 
leak important information. 
The primary area of concern for this variant has been 
javascript in web browsers and some other on-the-fly compiled 
code, such as the Berkley Packet Filter (BPF) Just-In-Time 
(JIT) compiler included in the Linux kernel. However, the BPF 
JIT is not enabled by default, lessening the concern for the 
Linux kernel. A small fix to validate array indexes provided to 
the Linux kernel originating from user-space was implemented; 
however, it is not tested for this paper because of its expected 
impact being too small for practical measurement and the lack 
of a flag to disable it. 
B. Variant 2: Spectre, Branch Target Injection 
Spectre variant 2 allows for an attacker to cause the 
speculative execution engine to mispredict an indirect jump to 
a branch of code. It does this by performing various operations 
that cause the branch target predictor to speculate a branch to 
an attacker-chosen location. This misprediction can then be 
used to execute a Spectre variant 1 attack in places not 
normally accessible to such an attack. 
Fixing this flaw requires a combination of several new 
processor instructions collectively known as Indirect Branch 
Control (IBC), delivered to existing chips via microcode 
updates, and further software changes to prevent the 
speculative execution engine from taking a mispredicted 
branch. The software fixes utilize these new IBC processor 
instructions in appropriate places and change the instructions 
used to implement indirect branches. This latter change, which 
has become known as retpolines, changes an indirect branch 
from being implemented with the JMP or CALL instruction to 
setting the RSB register and issuing a RET instruction, 
traditionally used to return to the previous location after a JMP 
or CALL. This nontraditional method of performing an indirect 
branch bypasses the indirect branch predictor entirely, as RET 
instructions were never envisioned to be used in this manner. 
Both of these changes require recompilation of affected 
software, potentially a significant barrier for closed-source or 
legacy code. 
C. Variant 3: Meltdown, Rogue Data Cache Load 
Meltdown (known as variant 3) allows for an attacker to 
cause the speculative execution engine to read a memory 
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address not normally accessible, in advance of the permission 
check for the read operation. The speculative execution engine 
will discard the read when it later discovers the result of the 
permission check and prior to marking the speculative 
execution as complete. However, side effects of this 
speculative read, especially the loading of the speculatively 
read memory address into cache, can be detected through 
various side channels. 
The near-term fix to this flaw has been to separate the page 
tables of user-space and kernel-space. Previously kernel 
memory was mapped into all user-space processes for 
performance, relying on the memory permission flags to 
prevent inappropriate access. Splitting the kernel memory 
space into its own page table prevents speculative reads from 
user-space being able to target kernel memory, at the cost of an 
additional page table switch during every transition from user-
space to kernel-space and back (every syscall) and additional 
overhead when coping user memory to kernel functions. This 
change has become known as Kernel Page Table Isolation 
(KPTI). 
GRSecurity and the associated PAX project has long had a 
feature that “hardened” and performed additional checks on 
memory access between user-space and kernel-space. This 
feature is called UDEREF, for user-space dereference. The 
mainline kernel’s KPTI feature was merged with these existing 
protections in GRSecurity-enabled kernels and cannot be 
separately enabled or disabled. 
III. EXPERIMENTAL ENVIRONMENT 
The MIT Lincoln Laboratory Supercomputing Center 
provides a high performance computing platform to over 1000 
users at MIT, and is heavily focused on highly iterative 
interactive supercomputing and rapid prototyping workloads 
[Reuther 2004, Bliss]. As part of our mission to deliver new 
and innovative technologies and methods enabling scientists 
and engineers to quickly ramp up the pace of their research by 
leveraging big compute and big data storage assets, we have 
built the MIT SuperCloud [Reuther 2013], a fusion of the four 
large computing ecosystems: supercomputing, enterprise 
computing, big data and traditional databases into a coherent, 
unified platform.  The MIT SuperCloud has spurred the 
development of a number of cross-ecosystem innovations in 
high performance databases [Byun, Kepner 2014], database 
management [Prout 2015], data protection [Kepner 2014b], 
database federation [Kepner 2013, Gadepally], data analytics 
[Kepner 2012] and system monitoring [Hubbell]. 
A. Hardware Platform 
All the experiments described in this paper were performed 
on the TX-Green Supercomputer at MIT Lincoln Laboratory. 
The TX-Green Supercomputer used to perform these 
environmental simulations is a petascale system that consists of 
a heterogeneous mix of AMD, Intel, and Knights Landing-
based servers connected to a single, non-blocking 10 Gigabit 
Ethernet Arista DCS-7508 core switch.  All of the compute 
nodes used in these performance tests were Intel Xeon E5-2683 
v3 (Haswell) servers with 256 GB of system RAM.  The Lustre 
[Braam] central storage system uses a 10 petabyte Seagate 
ClusterStor CS9000 storage array that is directly connected to 
the core switch, as is each individual cluster node.  This 
architecture provides high bandwidth to all the nodes and the 
central storage, and is depicted in Figure 1. 
B. Software Environment 
Our tests were performed on the MIT SuperCloud platform 
running GridOS 26, a derivative of Red Hat Fedora 26. The 
systems run Linux kernel version 4.4.131 and Lustre client 
2.10.3. The tests were performed both with and without 
GRSecurity. In all, six different compilations of the Linux 
kernel and 10 configurations were tested. 
The baseline configuration had all of the recent Linux kernel 
changes to address Meltdown or Spectre set to disabled and 
microcode revision 0x2e, which does not include the IBC 
updates. The first test configuration had 
PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION configuration option enabled for 
the mainline kernel, and PAX_MEMORY_UDEREF 
configuration option enabled for the GRSecurity-enhanced 
kernel. The second test configuration was based on the first 
with RETPOLINE configuration option added. The third 
configuration was the same kernel as the second, but also had 
the system BIOS updated to the latest release that included 
microcode revision 0x3c [Microcode]. The final configuration 
reverted to the baseline kernel, but with the BIOS updated with 
the 0x3c microcode. These configurations are show in Table 1. 
These kernels were compiled with gcc 4.8.5-28.el7 for the 
baseline, test 1 and test 4. The kernel used for Test 2 and Test 3 
was compiled with gcc 4.8.5-28.el7_5.1 to include the new 
compiler changes for retpolines. 
  PTI/UDEREF Retpoline BIOS/Microcode 
Baseline       
Test 1 Yes     
Test 2 Yes Yes   
Test 3 Yes Yes Yes 
Test 4     Yes 
IV. BENCHMARK DESIGN 
Several benchmarks were chosen to both highlight the 
maximum impact of the changes to address these 
Table 1.  Table of configurations tested for both mainline and 
GRSecurity-enhanced kernels. 
Figure 1.  Architecture of the MIT SuperCloud system. Users connect 
to the system over either a local area network or a wide area network. 
At the time of connection, their system joins the MIT SuperCloud 
and can act as a compute node in order to run parallel programs 
interactively. The centerpiece of the MIT SuperCloud is several file 
systems (Seagate, DDN, Dell, Hadoop, and Amazon S3) running on 
several different network fabrics (10 GigE, InfiniBand, OmniPath). 
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vulnerabilities and evaluate their impact on realistic scientific 
workloads.  In all cases, we performed the test multiple times, 
and took the fastest result.  System disk caches were not 
cleared inbetween repeated runs, ensuring that the results are 
for a “hot cache” situation. 
A. Network Connection Establishment 
Establishing a TCP network connection is a fundamental 
component of almost all uses of a network computer. In 
scientific computing, these connections are often used from 
within an MPI library or other framework to communicate 
among the systems participating in a distributed computation. 
For this test, we decided to look at one of the worst-case usages 
of TCP: transmitting a single byte. Most real-world uses of 
TCP will not behave this way and will keep an established TCP 
connection open to transfer more data. However, the heavy 
reliance on the operating system kernel during TCP connection 
establishment allows us to focus on the impact of the KPTI 
modification to address the Meltdown vulnerability, which is 
known to slow down transitions between user-mode and 
kernel-mode operation required by syscalls. 
We performed this test both with and without the User-
Based Firewall [Prout 2016] for controlling access between 
nodes. We used netcat on both the client and server systems 
which were both configured with the appropriate kernel for 
each test. While the impact of the User-Based Firewall itself 
had already been previously profiled, it adds a significant 
number of syscalls to the process of establishing the 
connection, which may be adversely effected by the KPTI 
modification. 
B. Disk Access 
Reading and writing to disk are fundamental operations of 
computer programs. For this test, we decided to look at one of 
the worst-case usages of disk access: writing one byte at a time. 
There are many ways to optimize disk utilization, both 
generally and specific to scientific computing or high 
performance file systems. However, optimization requires the 
application author to have done so, or be willing to do so. A 
significant number of applications have not done so. It is often 
impractical to modify these applications for a variety of 
reasons: they are closed-source, part of a large open-source 
project that would require significant investment to modify, or 
experimental code that is not expected to be used often and not 
worth the developer’s time investment. This test again allows 
us to focus on the impact of the KPTI modification which is 
known to slow down transitions between user-mode and 
kernel-mode operation required by syscalls. 
We performed this test on both the local filesystem backed 
by traditional spinning disk and the high performance parallel 
network filesystem running Lustre. We used the “dd” program 
to write 10 MB of data from the “zero device” to a new file for 
each test. While previous testing has highlighted the 
performance that is possible for optimized access to Lustre 
[Jones], the syscall heavy nature of writing one byte at a time 
was expected to be adversely affected by the KPTI 
modification. 
C. Computationally intensive code 
We tested two computationally intensive workflows, 
pMatlab and Keras with Tensorflow. 
MATLAB® is commonly used for scientific computing and 
pMatlab (parallel Matlab) provides the capability to perform 
that computation in parallel [Bliss 2007]. pMatlab is used 
extensively at MIT Lincoln Laboratory both with MATLAB® 
and the open-source GNU Octave project. 
pMatlab comes with several examples as part of the 
distribution. For this test, we chose to run the pBlurimage 
example with 16 worker processes. We ran these in local mode 
on a single node to eliminate the variability of network access 
and the HPC scheduler. These tests were run with matlab 
version 2017B. 
The rise of effective machine learning has resulted in the 
development of many deep learning frameworks and libraries 
such as Caffe, TensorFlow, Torch, scikit-learn, Theano, 
DIGITS, and many more.  While many of these often lean 
heavily on special-purpose hardware (e.g., GPUs or TPUs) and 
software (e.g., CUDA and cuBLAS) that relieve the primary 
processor of most of the computational load of these tasks and 
eliminate many instances of user-to-kernelspace context 
switching, the architecture of newer vector processors, such as 
the Intel Xeon Phi (Knight’s Landing), enables competitive 
machine learning rates without the use of an additional 
coprocessor.   
Our machine learning test trains a simple convolutional 
neural network (CNN) on the MNIST database, a large dataset 
consisting of handwritten digits frequently used in machine 
learning training, applying the Keras deep-learning framework 
atop a TensorFlow 1.6 backend.  The TensorFlow, Keras, and 
Numpy packages used here were sourced from the Intel 
Distribution for Python as provided in the Anaconda Cloud. 
These packages leverage Intel’s Math Kernel Library for Deep 
Neural Networks (MKL-DNN), a library providing highly 
parallel and vectorized mathematical functions that improve the 
performance of machine learning applications on x86 
processors. 
V. PERFORMANCE RESULTS 
The results of our performance testing are shown in Figures 
2, 3 and 4. 
Figure 2.  Time to establish 1,000 TCP connections and send one 
byte each via netcat. 
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Figure 2 shows the results of our tests on network 
connection establishment. The impact is much higher with the 
User-Based Firewall than without. This result is not unexpected 
as the firewall adds a significant number of user-kernel mode 
transitions to the process of accepting an inbound TCP 
connection. However, the impact of the UDEREF feature in 
GRSecurity is significantly greater than the impact of KPTI 
mitigation in the mainline kernel. With all mitigations enabled, 
the mainline kernel is slowed down by approximately 15% 
without and 21% with the User-Based Firewall. The 
GRSecurity-enabled kernel is also slowed down by 15% 
without, but 67% with the User-Based Firewall. 
Figure 3 shows the results of our tests on disk access. The 
impact on local disk access is much higher than on Lustre 
access. This is likely caused by Lustre being slower overall for 
the small block size chosen due to the required network round-
trips, hiding some of the impact of the mitigations. With all 
mitigations enabled, the mainline kernel is slowed down by 
approximately 50% on local disk and 33% on Lustre. The 
GRSecurity-enabled kernel is slowed down by 90% on local 
disk and 33% on Lustre. 
Figure 4 shows the results of our tests on computationally 
intensive code. As expected, the kernel changes appear to have 
little effect on these benchmarks as they make few requests for 
kernel services (syscalls). However, a noticeable slowdown 
was seen with the microcode updated, which inspired Test 4 to 
be added. As shown in the Test 4 configuration, the 
performance impact remained even when all advertised 
mitigations were deactivated simply by having a CPU running 
the new microcode. These slowdowns were measured at 21% 
for pMatlab and 16% for TensorFlow for the baseline kernel 
with all mitigations (Test 3) and 19% and 15% respectively 
with just the microcode (Test 4). 
VI. SUMMARY 
The Spectre and Meltdown vulnerabilities represent a novel 
class of attacks. The original announcement of these 
vulnerabilities aptly stated that Spectre will haunt us for quite 
some time. New attacks within these classes are expected to be 
discovered requiring additional nontrivial mitigations. 
Our testing shows that the mitigations for these 
vulnerabilities can have significant impacts. Worse yet, for the 
microcode update the impacts are present even with all 
software mitigations turned off. This means that in systems 
where performance is more important than security, such as in 
a closed non-internet-connected system with a dedicated 
userbase, it is not easy to maintain that performance if a BIOS 
update is needed to address some other issue with the system. 
Our testing also shows a significant deviation between the 
mainline and GRSecurity-enabled kernels. The majority of the 
deviation for the GRSecurity-enabled results appears with the 
UDEREF mitigation. While UDEREF is advertised to be 
comparable to KPTI, our testing suggests it is not. 
The choice of unoptimized benchmarks for network 
connection establishment and disk access was intended to show 
the worst-case scenario. While well-optimized code will 
experience significantly less impact than the worst case, we 
find that we run a vast amount of unoptimized code. MIT 
Lincoln Laboratory Supercomputing Center focuses on 
interactive supercomputing and rapid prototyping. These 
workloads are often unoptimized because of their one-time use 
nature or the immaturity of the project they support. It has not 
previously been worthwhile to invest the staff time toward 
correcting this, given the size of the performance penalties 
involved. However, the wisdom of this decision is predicated 
on knowing the size of the penalty involved. 
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